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advisable. Experience tells us that back seat suggestions as to the
handling of a car are disconcerting and irritating to the driver (more
so as between husband and wife). Indeed this is one case where
silence is generally golden. At present the cases seem to make no
distinction between the liability of a host and that of a third party.
The burdens of generosity should not be so great. It is submitted
that the legislature should relieve the situation by a statutory change,
and thereby relieve the host of part of his present burden. 25
MILLS SCOTT BENTON.
Procedure and Practise-Relation Between Survival and
Wrongful Death Statutes Where Death
Follows Injury
Two recent decisions construing the North Carolina survival'
and wrongful death 2 statutes have aroused speculation as to what
actions for personal injuries survive to the personal representative.
In both cases the decedent was injured by the defendant's alleged
negligence. In the state case3 decedent died before the termination
of his suit, but did not die from the injuries sustained by the de-
fendant's negligence. In the federal case 4 the jury found that the
decedent was injured by the defendant's negligence, and awarded
damages, but found, also, that the decedent's death was not caused
by the injuries inflicted by the defendant's negligence. In these cases
it was held that the cause of action for personal injuries not resulting
in death survived.
At common law no right of action for personal injuries survived
:he death of the injured or injuring party. Our survival statute5
provides that all causes of action survive except those specifically
declared not to survive. Since the amendment 6 of our survival stat-
ute, it is now clear that if the injured party dies without a recovery,
compromise, or settlement, and not as a result of the defendant's
negligence, the cause of action survives. 7 Also, the cause of action
'For discussion of proposed statute to meet this situation, see p. 47.1 N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§159, 162, 163.2 Ibid., §§160, 161.
'Fuquay, Adm'x v. A. & W. R. R. Co., 199 N. C. 499 (1930).
'James Baird Co., Inc., v. Boyd, 41 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'Supra note 1.
REv. (1905) §157 (2), as amended by N. C. Pun. LAvs (1915), c. 38.
Infra note 16.
'Fuquay, Adm'x v. A. & W. R. R. Co., supra note 3; cf. Bolick v. R. R.
Co., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).
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survives, under like circumstances, against the personal representative
of a deceased defendant.8
The question of interest is raised by the situation in which the
injured party dies from the injuries sustained through the defend-
ant's negligence. Does the personal representative have one cause of
action for the decedent's injury and suffering under the survival stat-
ute, and another cause of action for the wrongful death under the
wrongful death statute ?9 It is settled in this state and by the majority
opinion in this country, and in England' 0 that a recovery, compro-
mise, or settlement, prior to the death of the injured party will bar
an action by the personal representative for the wrongful death. The
reason for this rule is that the specific wording of the statute requires
that the injured party have a cause of action against the defendant
at the time of the former's death." But, under the strict wording
of our statutes, why should not a cause of action for unrecompensed
injuries survive when there is a cause of action for the wrongful
death. In some jurisdictions where there are both survival and
wrongful death statutes, two separate causes of action exist to the
personal representative and may be prosecuted concurrently. 12 The
Federal Employers Liability Act provides for two separate causes of
action, and treats them as capable of being joined by the personal
representative.' 3 Our court says that our law differs from the fed-
eral law on this subject 14 and holds that after the injured party's
death there is only one cause of action, and that is for the wrongful
death. This ruling seems to be based on decisions before the change
of the statute. 15
It would appear that the North Carolina statute of the survival
of personal injury causes is independent of the wrongful death stat-
'Tonkins, Adm'r v. Cooper, 187 N. C. 570, 122 S. E. 294 (1924) ; cf. Watts
v. Vanderbilt, 167 N. C. 567, 83 S. E. 813 (1914).9 Supra note 2.
"
0Edwards, Adm'r v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635,
L. R. A. 1916D, 121 (1915); Littlewood v. The Mayor, Etc., 89 N. Y. 24, 42
AM. REP. 271 (1882); Sou. Bell Tele. Co. v. Cassin, 111 Ga. 575, 36 S. E. 881,
50 L. R. A. 694 (1900); Thompson v. R. R. Co., 97 Tex. 590, 80 S. W. 990
(1904) ; Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 57
L. ed. 417 (1912) ; Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 48 Sup. Ct. 541, 72 L. ed.
906 (1927) ; Read v. Great East. R. R. Co., L. R. 3 C. Q. B. 555 (1868).
'Edwards v. Chem. Co., and Mellon v. Goodyear, supra note 10.
"Sdu. Bell Tele. Co. v. Cassin, supra note 10; Mahoning Valley R. R. Co.
v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N. E. 601, 14 L. R. A. (n. s.) 893 (1908).
' St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & Sou. R. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct.
704, 59 L. ed. 1160 (1914).
" Cobia, Adm'x v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 188 N. C. 487, 125 S. E. 18 (1924).
" Gurley v. Power Co., 172 N. C. 690, 696, 90 S. E. 943 (1916).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ute, and, if the cause of action not resulting in death should survive,
that the cause of action resulting in death should also survive.' 6
This is apparently the view of the court in the principal federal
case' 7 and it is submitted as correct.
JAMES A. WILLIAMS.
Workmen's Compensation-Measure of Compensation
for Loss of Member
In the workmen's compensation laws of various jurisdictions are
found provisions for temporary total disability caused by industrial
accidents and for specific injuries,-such as loss of fingers. For total
disability of temporary or permanent character it is uniformly stipu-
lated that the compensation shall run during such liability, or for
the statutory period.' The three types of statute dealing with spe-
cific injuries are: (1) Those which provide that compensation for
specific injuries shall "be in lieu of all other compensation," 2 or its
practical equivalent, that the compensation period shall begin to
run from the date of the injury ;3 (2) Those which provide that com-
pensation under one section of the law shall be in addition to other
compensation;4 (3) Those which simply set up a scale of compen-
sation, or indemnity, and leave the court to work out a proper inter-
pretation of the whole statute as best it can.5
Court decisions interpreting these provisions of the statutes like-
wise fall into fairly well defined groups. One group of courts holds
that during the healing period while the workman is unable to work,
he may recover for total disability, and then, when he has returned
to work, he is to receive the full statutory amount for the specific
"Prior to the amendment of REv. (1905) §157 (2) by N. C. PUB. LAws
(1915) c. 38, striking out the clause, "where such injury does not cause the
death of the injured party," the cause of action for personal injuries abated,
and only the cause of action for the wrongful death remained. Bolick v. R. R.
Co., stepra note 7; MCINToSH, N. C. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
(1929) §424.
"James Baird Co., Inc. v. Boyd, supra note 4.
IN. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill's 1923) c. 66, §15; IowA CODE (1927) §1394;
N. C. PuB. LAWS (1929) c. 120, §29.
' GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §3154 (32); Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922)
§4899.
'IOWA CODE (1927) §1396.
'MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 152, §36; CLO. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's
Mills, 1927) §1853.
'N. C. PuB. LAWS (1929) c. 120, §31; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, Supp.
1929) §8081 (MM).
